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Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions:
Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment
By JOHN A. LIST AND DAVID LUCKING-REILEY*
Recent auction theory suggests that multiunit
uniform-price auctions, as used by the U.S.
Treasury for debt sales, produce incentives that
may cause bidders to bid less than their true
valuations, resulting in inefficient allocations
and reduced revenue. In this paper, we present
the results of a field experiment in which we
auction nearly $10,000 worth of sportscards in
two-unit, two-person sealed-bid auctions. We
randomize participants into uniform-price and
Vickrey auction treatments, and find underbid-
ding in the uniform-price auctions’ second-unit
bids, as predicted. In contrast with theoretical
predictions, however, we find that individuals’
first-unit bids are significantly higher in the
uniform-price than in the Vickrey treatment.
The bid differences are large enough to affect
the allocation of goods, as split allocations
result significantly more often in the uniform-
price treatment. We find no significant differ-
ence in revenues across auction formats.
Nearly four decades ago, William Vickrey
(1961) illustrated the appealing features of second-
price sealed-bid auctions. In particular, he showed
that second-price auctions induce “truthtelling”
for bidders with independent private values (IPV);
it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to reveal
his or her maximum willingness to pay for the
good. Hence, second-price auctions are alloca-
tively efficient, as the bidder with the highest
value always wins. In the same paper, Vickrey
also considered the problem of a multiunit auction
for m units of a good. He demonstrated that full
demand revelation will occur in a sealed-bid auc-
tion where each bidder submits one bid and the
top m bidders each win one good at a uniform
price equal to the first bid rejected. He writes,
“only in this way is it possible to insure that each
bidder will be motivated to put in a bid at the full
value of the article to himself, thus assuring an
optimum allocation of resources.” A number of
economists used similar intuition when recom-
mending the uniform-price sealed-bid format for
its use in settings such as Treasury auctions.1
As Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter C. Cram-
ton (1996) point out, Vickrey’s caveat in his
very next paragraph went unnoticed by many
economists:
It is important to realize, however, that
this result applies only to cases where
each bidder is interested in at most a sin-
gle unit. . . . As soon as we consider the
more general case where an individual
bidder may be interested in securing two
or more of the units, where the number of
bidders is still too few to produce a fully
competitive market, the possibility [of a]
Pareto-optimal result . . . disappears.
Vickrey did not find a solution to the problem of
a demand-revealing auction with multiunit bid-
ders, but Edward H. Clarke (1971) and Theo-
dore Groves (1973) later provided general
principles for revelation mechanisms, which
can be applied to derive the correct multiunit
generalization for the Vickrey auction. Specifi-
cally, the rules for an m-object Vickrey auction
are that bidders can submit as many individual-
unit bids as they like, that the top m bids will be
declared winners, and that for the kth unit won
by a bidder, she or he must pay an amount equal
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1 For more details on recommendations of uniform-price
auctions by economists, see Ausubel and Cramton (1996).
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to the kth highest of the rejected bids submitted
by others.2 When each bidder has demand for
only a single unit of the good, this mechanism
reduces to a uniform price auction.
Several authors have recently investigated
equilibria in uniform-price auctions with multi-
unit demand, including Brett E. Katzman
(1995), Charles Noussair (1995), Richard En-
gelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles M. Kahn
(1998), and Ausubel and Cramton (1996). The
first three consider situations where each bidder
has private values for up to two units of the
auctioned good, and give examples where the
predicted equilibrium involves demand reduc-
tion—second-unit bids are lower than true val-
uations. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998)
provide a general characterization of equilibria
in such environments. They show that bidders
have a dominant strategy of truthtelling on the
first unit of the good, and of demand reduction
(at least weakly) on the second unit. Demand
reduction is strictly greater than zero in many
circumstances, including the case where both
bidders’ valuations are drawn independently
from the same distribution. They also provide
necessary conditions for the existence of “single-
unit bid” equilibria, where each bidder submits
a bid of zero on the second unit; in the extreme,
such equilibria can result in zero revenues for
the auctioneer.
Ausubel and Cramton (1996) present a general
theory of demand reduction and inefficiency in
multiunit auctions. They generalize previous mul-
tiunit demand models by allowing each individual
to demand an arbitrary number of units and by
allowing valuations to be correlated. To simplify
the analysis, they assume that the auctioned good
is infinitely divisible rather than discrete. Ausubel
and Cramton provide sufficient conditions for de-
mand reduction (and hence inefficiency)3 in a
uniform-price auction: as long as at least one
bidder has downward-sloping demand, any Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed to have bid reduction.
They also show that the revenue ranking of Vick-
rey and uniform-price auctions is ambiguous,
depending on the underlying distribution of valu-
ations. For most “standard” IPV probability dis-
tributions (those with a nondecreasing hazard
rates, such as the uniform), however, they predict
the Vickrey auction should revenue-dominate the
uniform price auction.
Our work compares the multiunit Vickrey for-
mat to the uniform price format in a field experi-
ment, contributing to the empirical literature on
multiunit auctions. Several laboratory experiments
have investigated multiunit auctions with single-
unit demand, where demand reduction is not an
issue (James C. Cox et al., 1984, 1985; Kevin A.
McCabe et al., 1990, 1991). Paul Alsemgeest et al.
(1998) find some demand reduction in the labora-
tory, in a dynamic ascending version of a uniform-
price auction whose equilibrium is unknown.
Ausubel and Cramton (1999) argue that the simul-
taneous ascending FCC auction format is strategi-
cally similar to a uniform-price sealed-bid auction,
and present field data from the FCC spectrum
auctions that are suggestive of demand reduction.
Catherine D. Wolfram (1998) analyzes data from
uniform-price auctions for electricity supply in
England and Wales, finding evidence of the stra-
tegic behavior predicted by theory. The genera-
tors’ marginal bids overstated their true marginal
costs, an effect analogous to “demand reduction”
in a supply auction.4
Our study complements the closely related
paper by John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (2000).
2 Technically, these rules are demand revealing only in
cases where every bidder’s demand curve is either flat or
downward sloping, as is assumed in the theoretical papers
cited here. If bidders might have upward-sloping demands
(increasing returns to scale in purchases), then this simple
price rule no longer works; a slightly more complicated set
of instructions would be required to implement a Groves-
Clarke truthtelling mechanism.
3 Allocative inefficiency results from demand reduction
because high-value bidders who reduce their bids below
their valuations potentially are outbid by bidders with lower
valuations. For example, a bidder with high values on both
first and second units will often win the first unit but lose the
second unit to a bidder whose second-unit valuation is
lower.
4 Other multiunit studies include those by Gary J. Miller
and Charles R. Plott (1985), who focus on revenue compar-
isons between uniform-price and discriminatory auctions in
the laboratory. Rafael Tenorio (1993) and Steven R. Umlauf
(1993) perform similar revenue comparisons with field data
on Zambian currency auctions and Mexican Treasury bill
auctions, respectively. Some recent laboratory experiments
have explored auction environments with subjects selling
multiple units of dissimilar goods (List and Shogren, 1998b)
and buying multiple units of dissimilar, complementary
goods (David Brenner and John Morgan, 1997; John O.
Ledyard et al., 1997; Charles R. Plott, 1997; Mark Isaac and
Duncan James, 1999).
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Their laboratory experiment looked for demand
reduction by comparing the uniform price
sealed-bid format with Ausubel’s (1997)
ascending-bid version of the Vickrey auction.
The experiment was carefully designed to sat-
isfy Ausubel and Cramton’s (1996) sufficient
conditions for demand reduction: a single two-
unit human bidder competed against robot bid-
ders with unit demand (thus, the robots’
demands were downward sloping). Confirming
the theory, Kagel and Levin (2000) observed
systematic bid reduction by human subjects on
their second units in uniform-price auctions, by
comparison both with actual values and with
strategies observed in the Vickrey/Ausubel auc-
tion. However, they also observed overbidding
relative to the dominant strategy on both units in
the uniform-price sealed-bid auction, an effect
unpredicted by theory but common to other
sealed-bid laboratory studies.5 A third treat-
ment, an ascending-bid implementation of the
uniform price auction, eliminated the sealed-bid
overbidding effect and produced more striking
demand reduction. Kagel and Levin (2000) find
that although efficiency is higher in the Vickrey/
Ausubel auction than in the uniform-price
sealed-bid auction, revenues are higher in the
uniform-price sealed-bid auction.
Our experiment differs from that of Kagel
and Levin in four important ways. First, we test
the uniform-price sealed-bid auction against the
Vickrey sealed-bid auction, whereas Kagel and
Levin run the dynamic (Ausubel) version of the
Vickrey auction. Second, we have two human
bidders per auction, rather than a single human
versus a robot. Third, we use real goods rather
than induced values. Fourth, we perform the
experiment in the field rather than in the labo-
ratory.
Our field experiments are most similar in
methodology to those of List and Jason F.
Shogren (1998a) and List et al. (1998), who use
card-show experiments to investigate questions
of contingent valuation. Field experiments
present a trade-off: they give up some of the
controls of a laboratory experiment (such as
induced valuations, or robots guaranteed to play
equilibrium strategies against human subjects)
in exchange for increased realism.6 Our exper-
iments match the real-world settings that auc-
tion theory attempts to explain: our bidders
compete for real goods rather than explicit cash
values, they are not told explicitly the distribu-
tions of other’s valuations, and they are likely to
have previous experience bidding for the types
of goods being auctioned.7 Field experiments
provide a useful middle ground between the
tight controls of the laboratory and the vagaries
of completely uncontrolled field data.
I. Experimental Design
We designed our experiment to compare out-
comes in uniform-price and Vickrey sealed-bid
auctions, with particular attention to the ques-
tion of demand reduction. We conducted equal
numbers of Vickrey and uniform-price auctions,
with different bidders in each auction. We also
experimented with bidder type, conducting
some of our experiments with professional card
dealers and others with nondealers. This treat-
ment was designed to capture the distinction
between the theoretical cases of bidders with
steep downward-sloping demands (individual
consumers) and those with relatively flat de-
mands (dealers) for multiple identical units. The
auctioned sportscards fit into two price catego-
ries: low (book value of $3) and high (book
value of $70). We conducted our treatments in
June 1998, at a sportscard show in Orlando, FL,
where we had a ready supply of card collectors
interested in bidding in the auctions.
For the low-priced card auctions we chose a
Joe Montana 1982 Topps football card and a
1989 Michael Jordan Hoops basketball card.
5 See, for example, Cox et al. (1985), Kagel et al. (1987),
and Kagel and Levin (1993). Remarkably, Kagel and Levin
(2000) still found this effect despite specifically instructing
subjects that overbidding valuations could never increase
profits, only reduce them.
6 Lucking-Reiley (1999a, b) gives up even more control
in his field experiments, using Internet-based auctions in a
preexisting market with an unknown number of participat-
ing bidders. These papers test the theory of revenue equiv-
alence between four different single-unit auction formats,
and the theory of reserve prices in first-price sealed-bid
auctions.
7 Given the proliferation of sportscard auctions, we feel
we can safely assume that most of our participants (all
recruited at a sportscard trade show) have previous experi-
ence bidding in auctions for such goods. For example, see
Sports Collectors’ Digest, a weekly publication filled with
sportscard and sports memorabilia auctions.
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Both cards had a June 1998 book value of $3.
For the higher-priced auctions we selected a Cal
Ripken, Jr. 1982 Topps baseball card and a
Barry Sanders 1989 Score football card. These
two cards had book values of approximately
$70. We sold dozens of each type of card, with
all the cards in identical condition. All lower-
priced cards were independently graded by a
sportscard dealer as “near-mint,” and each high-
er-priced card was graded as “PSA 8 near-mint”
by a well-known agency, Professional Sports
Authenticators (PSA).8 All auctions for a given
card type displayed the same sportscards to
bidders, and identical copies were sold to win-
ning bidders after the auctions concluded.
For the simplest possible test of demand-
reduction theory, we chose a design with two
bidders and two goods per auction. We invited
two bidders to submit two bids each for two
identical sportscards, in an auction with no re-
serve price. We chose the auction format and
card type for each subject according to a pre-
specified plan, to avoid accidentally introducing
experimenter bias. After receiving bids from
subjects within a given treatment, we randomly
matched pairs of bidders to determine the out-
come of each two-person auction. No partici-
pant bid in more than one auction. Our design is
intended for between-subject comparisons; we
draw our subjects from the same population and
test whether the auction treatment has statisti-
cally significant effects on the average behavior
of the population.9
Each participant’s experience followed four
steps: 1) inspection of the good, 2) learning the
auction rules, 3) placing two bids, and 4) conclu-
sion of the transaction. In step 1, a potential sub-
ject approached the experimenter’s table and
inquired about the sale of the two sportscards
displayed on the table. The experimenter then
invited the potential subject to take about 5 min-
utes to participate in an auction for the two sports-
cards. If she agreed to participate, the subject
could pick up and visually examine each card (in
a sealed cardholder, with the graded card condi-
tion clearly marked). The experimenter worked
one-on-one with the participant and imposed no
time limit on inspection of the cards.
In step 2, the administrator gave the partici-
pant an instruction sheet that consisted of two
parts: 1) an auction rules sheet, which also
included a practice worksheet, and 2) a bidding
sheet.10 In each auction type we informed the
bidders that card dealers would bid against one
other card dealer and nondealers would bid
against one other nondealer. We changed the
auction format and card type at the top of each
hour, so subjects were assigned to each treat-
ment based on the time they visited our table.
The instruction sheets were identical across
treatments, except for the explanations of the
pricing rules.
In the uniform-price treatment, subjects read
that “For each card won, the purchase price is
equal to the amount of the third-highest bid (that
is, the highest losing bid),” and they saw an
example with bids ranked and labeled $A, $B,
$C, and $D. In the Vickrey treatment, subjects
read that “For each card won, the purchase price
will be determined as follows. For the first unit
you win, you pay an amount equal to the highest
rejected bid which was not your own. For the
second unit you win, you pay an amount equal
to the second-highest rejected bid which was
not your own.” Because this rule is relatively
complicated, they saw three different examples
to illustrate possible outcomes with bids labeled
$A, $B, $C, and $D. We avoided using actual
dollar amounts in the examples, to avoid an-
choring of bids.
After reading the auction rules, each partici-
pant worked through a bidding worksheet
where each was asked to make up two numeric
bids for each of two bidders, then to compute
8 Since PSA charges a grading fee of $10 per card, we
chose not to have the $3 cards graded by PSA.
9 Ideally, we would obtain data on a single subject bid-
ding on the same card type in the two different auction
formats, to do within-subject comparisons. However, doing
the two auctions in sequence would most likely have
changed bidders’ demands for the goods (as two cards
would already have been awarded by the time the second
auction took place), thus destroying the ability to compare
the two auction formats while holding all else equal. We
considered collecting bids in both treatments from the same
subject and randomizing which auction would actually
“count” toward a real transaction, but rejected this idea in
favor of keeping the environment as simple and realistic as
possible. By explaining only one format to each bidder, we
felt we would reduce the possibility of confusion.
10 Verbatim copies of the experimental instructions are
available for download at ,http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
econ/reiley/..
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the final allocation and prices paid. The exper-
imenter checked the participant’s answers to
ensure that the subject understood the auction
rules. After having her questions answered, the
participant placed the two official bids on the
bidding sheets (step 3).11
Finally, in step 4 the experimenter explained
that the bidder should return at a specified time
(within several hours) to find out the results of the
auction and conduct any resulting transactions.
Transactions took place at 1:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.
both Saturday and Sunday. If a winning bidder did
not return for the specified transaction time, the
bidder would be contacted by phone within three
days after the show to complete the transaction.
Upon receipt of payment, we would pay the post-
age required to send the card(s) in the mail to the
winning bidder.
The dealer treatments took place in the same
way as the nondealer treatments, with one ex-
ception. Instead of waiting for participants to
arrive at the auction booth, the experimenter
visited each dealer at his booth before the
sportscard show opened, alternating the auction
format and card type. The nondealer treatments
took approximately 15 hours to complete (9:30
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Saturday and Sunday),
whereas the dealer treatments took only 2 1⁄2
hours (7:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. on Saturday).12
Table 1 shows the number of auctions of each
type in our experimental design. In total, we ran
164 different two-unit auctions, including 82
uniform-price and 82 Vickrey. We auctioned
328 sportscards with a total book value of
nearly $10,000.
II. Results
We test several predictions of the theory of
demand reduction discussed earlier. First, we ex-
pect to observe lower second-unit bids in the uni-
form price auction compared with the Vickrey
auction.13 Second, we expect no difference be-
11 In laboratory experiments, more than one trial is often
required before people understand the nature of certain
auction mechanisms. We decided to use a one-shot auction
so we could run the experiment on the floor of the sports-
card show. To test whether subjects understood the auction
mechanism, we ran a pilot study in May 1998 at a similar
sportscard show in Orlando. On completion of these hypo-
thetical auctions, subjects answered questions about their
understanding of the auction rules. Approximately 15 peo-
ple took part in each auction type, and no one had any
problem understanding the allocation and price rules.
12 The dealer sessions were completed in a more timely
fashion because the dealers (in their booths setting up their
own cards) were more accessible, and they understood the
auction rules more quickly than the nondealers (a number of
the dealers actually run auctions themselves). To discourage
collusion and/or information asymmetries, we swore each
of the dealers to secrecy about our cards and auction for-
mats. (Collusion was unlikely to be a factor anyway, with
100 dealers and over 200 nondealers matched randomly in
pairs in our experiments.)
13 Demand reduction is not guaranteed by Ausubel and
Cramton’s (1996) inefficiency theorem in our experiments;
it is difficult to guarantee in an auction for real goods that at
least one bidder has downward-sloping demand. However,
the existence (if not uniqueness) of demand-reduction equi-
libria is predicted by the theory, and our study aims to detect






Uniform Vickrey Uniform Vickrey
Barry Sanders $70 17 17 — —
1989 Score
Cal Ripken, Jr. $70 — — 15 15
1982 Topps
Michael Jordan $ 3 25 25 — —
1989 Hoops
Joe Montana $ 3 15 15 10 10
1982 Topps
a Each auction had two invited bidders who submitted up to two bids each. The numbers
in the cells represent the number of auctions run for each treatment type. For example, with
1989 Score Barry Sanders cards we ran 17 uniform-price auctions and 17 Vickrey auctions,
with two cards each, for a total of 68 Barry Sanders cards sold.
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tween first-unit bids in the uniform-price auction
and those in the Vickrey auction. Third, we expect
to find more zero bids in the uniform-price treat-
ment than in the Vickrey treatment.14 Finally, we
expect revenues to be lower in the uniform-price
auction than in the Vickrey auction.15
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our
auction data. The first four columns of Panel A
display means and standard deviations of the
bids submitted in each auction type. One pattern
in the data is that first-unit bids are larger in the
uniform-price auctions than in the correspond-
ing Vickrey auctions. The magnitude of the
difference is around $10 for the high-priced
($70) cards, and $0.03 to $0.46 for the low-
priced ($3) cards. The ranking reverses for
second-unit bids, supporting demand reduction
theories: Vickrey second-unit bids are approxi-
mately $12 higher than the corresponding
uniform-price bids for high-priced cards, and
$0.05 to $0.30 higher for the low-priced cards.
Further evidence of demand reduction is con-
tained in the next two columns of Panel A in
Table 2, which present differences between first
and second bids—a measure of the steepness of
each bidder’s downward-sloping bid schedule.
In each treatment, the mean difference between
14 Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) note, “we may
observe fewer bids in such uniform-price auctions than in
other forms of multi-unit auctions, a potentially testable
implication.” To our knowledge, this is the first study to test
that hypothesis.
15 As noted earlier, this prediction is not guaranteed by
the theory, but it is true for the standard distributions used
to provide concrete examples in auction theory.
TABLE 2—BIDS AND REVENUES
Panel A: Descriptive statisticsa
Bid 1b Bid 2c Bid 1–Bid 2d Revenuee
Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform
Sanders (ND)f $ 51.82 $ 62.35 $ 28.82 $ 16.62 $ 23.00 $ 45.74 $ 51.06 $ 48.71
(23.44) (25.67) (19.98) (15.40) (19.68) (25.71) (34.03) (32.26)
Ripken (D) 49.60 62.67 41.77 30.60 7.83 32.07 72.87 76.13
(15.19) (15.28) (14.46) (13.43) (9.16) (20.13) (25.26) (21.31)
Jordan (ND) 1.73 1.83 0.91 0.82 0.82 1.02 1.13 1.71
(1.51) (1.35) (1.04) (0.85) (1.11) (1.18) (1.52) (1.34)
Montana (D) 2.03 2.49 1.26 0.94 0.77 1.55 2.37 2.13
(0.86) (2.18) (0.84) (0.85) (0.56) (2.22) (1.33) (1.09)
Montana (ND) 1.37 1.40 0.47 0.42 0.90 0.98 0.66 0.83
(1.33) (1.44) (0.53) (0.61) (1.20) (1.20) (0.69) (1.00)
Panel B: Hypothesis tests for equality between Vickrey and uniform-price formatsg
Bid 1 Bid 2 Bid 1–Bid 2 Revenues
Sanders (ND) t 5 21.77 t 5 2.82 t 5 24.09 t 5 20.21
p 5 0.077 p 5 0.005 p 5 0.000 p 5 0.836
Ripken (D) t 5 23.32 t 5 3.10 t 5 26.00 t 5 20.38
p 5 0.002 p 5 0.001 p 5 0.000 p 5 0.702
Jordan (ND) t 5 20.38 t 5 0.47 t 5 20.86 t 5 21.42
p 5 0.706 p 5 0.638 p 5 0.391 p 5 0.156
Montana (D) t 5 20.88 t 5 1.19 t 5 21.52 t 5 0.44
p 5 0.377 p 5 0.235 p 5 0.128 p 5 0.658
Montana (ND) t 5 20.08 t 5 0.34 t 5 20.25 t 5 20.54
p 5 0.937 p 5 0.733 p 5 0.800 p 5 0.588
a Standard deviations of the data are in parentheses.
b Bid 1 data consist of the first bid submitted by each bidder.
c Bid 2 data consist of the second bid submitted by each bidder.
d Bid 1–Bid 2 data consist of the difference between a bidder’s first-unit bid and second-unit bid.
e Revenue equals the total payment received for both cards in the auction.
f (ND) denotes a nondealer treatment; (D) denotes a dealer treatment.
g We present each t statistic for the null hypothesis that the Vickrey bid minus the uniform-price bid equals zero, with the
corresponding two-tailed p-value.
966 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2000
first-unit and second-unit bids is much larger in
the uniform-price auctions than in the Vickrey
auctions.16
The rightmost columns of Panel A in Table
2 give descriptive statistics for auction revenues
generated by each pair of cards. Mean revenues
ranged from as low as 11 percent of book value
(in nondealer auctions for low-priced cards) to
as high as 54 percent of book value (in dealer
auctions for high-priced cards); low revenues
are unsurprising in auctions where only two
randomly selected bidders competed for two
cards.17 Dealer auctions had higher ratios of
revenue to book value than did nondealer auc-
tions; this probably indicates that nondealers
tend to have lower demand schedules for the
auctioned cards. There seems to be no system-
atic difference in revenues across auction
formats.
We next present formal statistical tests of our
hypotheses. The second panel of Table 2 con-
tains t-statistics and two-tailed p-values for
each of the hypotheses discussed below.18
A. First-Unit and Second-Unit Bids
One way to test for demand reduction is to
examine first-unit bids and second-unit bids in-
dividually. Theory predicts that first-unit bids
should be equal on average in the two auction
formats, since both auctions have the same
dominant strategy for first-unit bids, and that
second-unit bids should be lower on average in
the uniform-price format through strategic de-
mand reduction. Because we are most interested
in the presence of strategic demand reduction,
we first examine second-unit bids. The corre-
sponding column of Panel B in Table 2 shows
that all five t-statistics have the expected posi-
tive sign, indicating that second bids were larger
in the Vickrey auctions. The p-values indicate
that this difference is statistically significant for
the high-value ($70) cards ( p 5 0.005,
0.001), but not for the low-value ($3) cards
( p 5 0.638, 0.235, 0.733).
The results on first-unit bids, in the first
column of Panel B in Table 2, also provide
interesting insights. Despite the theoretical
prediction of equality of first-unit bids across
auction types, our point estimates show that
first-unit bids are higher on average in the
uniform-price auctions, and this is robust across
all five treatments. These effects are similar in
magnitude to the second-unit bid reduction
found previously, but are opposite in sign. For-
mal tests again indicate statistical significance
for the $70 cards ( p 5 0.077, 0.002), but not
for the $3 cards ( p 5 0.706, 0.377, 0.937).
We find the presence, not to mention the mag-
nitude, of this effect quite surprising, because it
is not predicted by any theory of which we are
aware. Because we cannot observe valuations
directly, this difference in first-unit bids could
represent either overbidding in the uniform-
price auction and/or underbidding in the Vick-
rey auction.
B. Bid Schedules
The previous subsection’s evidence of de-
mand reduction uses information on individu-
als’ first- and second-unit bids. We can perform
a potentially more powerful test of demand re-
duction by analyzing an individual’s entire de-
mand schedule. That is, we compute the
difference between an individual’s first-unit bid
and her second-unit bid, and test whether the
mean difference varies across auction treat-
ments. Demand reduction theory predicts that
the mean difference will be greater in the
uniform-price treatment, since first-unit bids
16 For example, differences between bid one and bid two
were $7–$23 in the Vickrey auctions for expensive cards,
compared with $30–$45 in the uniform price auctions. For
the lower-priced cards, bids differed by $0.80–$0.90 in the
Vickrey auctions, and $1.00–$1.50 in the uniform price
auctions.
17 To the extent that revenues are lower than could have
been earned through another selling mechanism, this repre-
sents personal financial investment in the research by the
experimenters. We could have invited more bidders to in-
crease revenues and thereby save money, but we felt that a
two-bidder environment gave us the best chance to observe
demand reduction. Similarly, we might have used positive
reserve prices to avoid selling cards at very low prices, but
this would also have reduced our ability to observe demand
reduction (by reducing the number of observed bids and
narrowing the range of acceptable bids).
18 We report results of a large-sample test, which does
not require stringent assumptions about the exact shapes of
the underlying distributions to generate a normally distrib-
uted test statistic. The large-sample assumption may be
somewhat strained for our smallest pair of samples (only 20
observations per sample). As a robustness check, we also
conducted small-sample t tests that assume the populations
have normal distributions and equal variances, and the re-
sults were not qualitatively different in any of the tests.
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should be unaffected across treatments, whereas
second-unit bids should be reduced in the
uniform-price auction.
The third column in Panel B of Table 2 pre-
sents the results of this hypothesis test. For the
high-value card treatments, bid differences are
statistically significant ( p , 0.001), as pre-
dicted. For each of the two low-value cards
auctioned to nondealers the differences have the
predicted sign but are statistically insignificant
( p 5 0.391, 0.800). The evidence is stronger
in the dealer treatment for the low-value card
( p 5 0.128), suggesting that dealers exhibit
some demand reduction on the low-value cards
as well as on the high-value cards. By contrast,
the nondealers appear to exhibit demand reduc-
tion only on the high-value cards.
The bid-reduction effect appears to be more
prominent when the stakes are higher. In light of
recent research on decision making in the pres-
ence of cognitive costs, this finding is intuitively
appealing.19 The results also suggest that with
low-priced cards, dealers may be more likely to
bid strategically, perhaps because they have to
exert less effort to formulate optimal bidding strat-
egies as dealers most likely have more experience
with auctions. Though several laboratory experi-
ments have investigated the effects of the size of
stakes, we believe ours is the first study to docu-
ment a similar effect in the field.
A related test examines the proportion of flat
bid schedules. Some bidders might value the
second unit of a card just as much as the first
one; we expect this to be particularly true for
dealers, who can often resell the second unit of
a card just as easily as the first. If such a bidder
truthfully reveals her demand, we would expect
the bid schedule to be completely flat (zero
difference between first-unit and second-unit
bids). The fifth and sixth columns of Table
3 report the proportion of bidders who submit-
ted flat bid schedules.
Demand-reduction theory predicts that the
proportion of flat-bid schedules should be lower
in the uniform-price auction than in the Vickrey
auction. Pooling across treatments, since this
test does not rely on bid magnitudes, we find
sample proportions of 23/164 (14 percent) and
45/164 (27.4 percent) for the uniform-price and
Vickrey auctions. A test of the null hypothesis
of equality yields a p-value of 0.003, indicating
that the uniform price auction yields signifi-
cantly fewer flat bid schedules across the com-
bined set of five treatments, as predicted.
C. Zero Bids
How extreme is the amount of demand re-
duction in our uniform-price auctions? As noted
earlier, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998)
predict that a higher proportion of second-unit
bids will equal zero in uniform-price auctions
19 See Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker (1993) for
an example of such a theory and its application to experi-
mental evidence. Robert Slonim and Alvin E. Roth (1998)
present a recent example of higher stakes causing behavior
to become more consistent with Nash equilibrium. John
Conlisk (1996) provides a nice review of research on the
topic of decision-making with deliberation costs.
TABLE 3—PROPORTIONS OF ZERO BIDS, OF FLAT-BID SCHEDULES, AND OF SPLIT ALLOCATIONS
Zeros on Bid 1a Zeros on Bid 2b Flat-bid schedulesc Split allocationsd
Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform
Sanders (ND)e 0.0 0.0 5.9 20.6 14.7 0.0 55.9 85.3
Ripken (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 36.7 6.7 23.3 86.7
Jordan (ND) 12.0 4.0 34.0 30.0 32.0 22.0 32.0 54.0
Montana (D) 0.0 0.0 10.0 25.0 20.0 5.0 60.0 45.0
Montana (ND) 10.0 13.3 40.0 50.0 30.0 30.0 46.7 53.3
Overall 5.5 3.7 20.1 26.2 27.4 14.0 41.5 65.2
Notes: All values are expressed as percentages.
a
“Zeros on bid 1” indicates the proportion of first-unit bids equal to zero.
b
“Zeros on bid 2” is the corresponding proportion for second-unit bids.
c
“Flat-bid schedules” denotes the proportion of bidders whose bid schedules are flat (first-unit bid equals second-unit bid).
d
“Split allocations” indicates the proportion of auctions for which the two goods were split between the two bidders.
e (ND) denotes a nondealer treatment; (D) denotes a dealer treatment.
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than in Vickrey auctions. This is strong demand
reduction, a second-unit bid reducing all the
way to zero. First-unit bids should be unaf-
fected; the choice of auction format should
cause more zeros only on second-unit bids. Col-
umns 1–4 of Table 3 provide data on the num-
ber of bids equal to zero in each of the auction
treatments. Since bid magnitudes do not matter
in these tests, we pool data across card types.
For first-unit bids, we received 9 zeros out of
164 bids (5.5 percent) in the Vickrey treatment,
and 6/164 (3.7 percent) in the uniform-price
treatment. A formal statistical test indicates no
significant difference between these proportions
( z 5 0.79, two-tailed p 5 0.428), which is
consistent with the theoretical prediction. All 15
of the zeros received in first-unit bids occurred
in the nondealer treatments with $3 cards; this
most likely indicates that those 15 individuals
literally had zero demand for the cards.20
The more important test is that for second-
unit bids. Here we see 33 of 164 bids (20.1
percent) equaling zero in the Vickrey treatment,
compared with 43 of 164 (26.2 percent) in the
uniform price treatment. This difference is not
statistically significant at conventional levels
( z 5 21.31, p 5 0.191). However, given our
earlier results that suggest low stakes do not
induce strategic behavior among nondealers, we
chose to redo this test excluding the Montana
and Jordan nondealer treatments.21 For the
pooled data on the other three treatments, a
formal test shows that the proportion of zero
bids is significantly higher in the uniform-price
auction format ( z 5 23.22, p 5 0.001).
Thus, at least in the treatments with high stakes
or more experienced bidders, we find evidence
of more zero bids in the uniform-price auction
format, a result predicted by theory.
D. Allocation of Goods
Demand reduction matters most when it causes
allocative inefficiency, moving the equilibrium al-
location of goods away from the Pareto optimum.
Despite the clear statistical evidence of demand
reduction in this study, the allocation effects might
still be inconsequential. Demand-reduction theory
predicts a single type of distortion from efficiency
in a two-bidder, two-good uniform-price auction:
a bidder with high values for both units reduces
his/her bid so much on the second unit that a
second bidder with strictly lower values manages
to win one of the two goods. This split allocation
of goods produces lower total surplus than would
an allocation that gives both units to the high-
value bidder.
Because this is a field experiment, we do not
observe bidders’ true valuations for the goods and,
therefore, we cannot provide a direct test of inef-
ficiency. We can, however, observe whether allo-
cations appear to be significantly different between
the two auction formats: do uniform-price auctions
result in more split allocations of the two goods than
do Vickrey auctions? The data in the final two col-
umns of Table 3 address this question.
With the exception of the dealer treatment for
Joe Montana ($3) cards, in every treatment the
sample proportion of split allocations is higher
for the uniform-price auction than for the Vick-
rey auction. In total, 34 of 82 auctions (41.5
percent) produced split allocations in the Vick-
rey treatment, compared with 53.522 of 82 auc-
tions (65.2 percent) in the uniform-price
treatment. The pooled data allow us to reject the
null hypothesis of equality between those pro-
portions ( z 5 25.31, p , 0.001). Thus, the
proportion of split allocations is significantly
higher in uniform-price auctions than in Vick-
rey auctions. We conclude that demand reduc-
tion is large enough to have economically
significant effects on allocative efficiency.
E. Revenues
Another natural question to ask is which auc-
tion format produces greater revenues. As noted
earlier, the theoretical literature yields uncertain
revenue rankings of the two auction formats,
20 Given the earlier results on lack of demand reduction
in the low-value nondealer treatments, this finding could
also be a reflection of reduced rationality by nondealers in
bidding for low-value cards.
21 Note that this automatically excludes all observations
with first-unit bids equal to zero.
22 Some auctions were ambiguous in their allocation,
because they had ties for the second-highest bid in the
auction. In practice, we flipped a coin to determine the
winner. For statistical purposes, we chose to classify such
outcomes as 0.5 of a split allocation, since such outcomes
were equally likely to result in splits as in two-unit pack-
ages.
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depending on the underlying structure of bidder
demands, but the simplest examples tend to
produce lower revenues in the uniform price
auction.23 Data on revenues are in the rightmost
columns in Panel A of Table 2, whereas results
of hypothesis tests for each treatment can be
found in Panel B of Table 2. The rankings are
indeed ambiguous: two of the treatments pro-
duced higher mean Vickrey revenues, whereas
three produced higher mean uniform-price rev-
enues. In none of the cases was the revenue
difference statistically significant.24
Kagel and Levin (2000) find that uniform-
price auctions revenue-dominate ascending-
format Vickrey auctions, in a demand environment
where the clear theoretical prediction was for
the Vickrey auction to dominate. By contrast,
we find that the uniform-price and Vickrey auc-
tions cannot be revenue ranked. This could be
the result of the difference between the labora-
tory and the field: demand conditions are known
and regular in the laboratory, but unknown and
potentially variable in the field. Indeed, Ausubel
and Cramton (1996) show that the revenue
rankings can depend critically on the underlying
demand structure. Alternatively, the difference
between our findings and those of Kagel and
Levin could be because our Vickrey auctions
were sealed bid, whereas their were ascending.
Their results indicate that sealed-bid auctions
generate overbidding relative to ascending auc-
tions in general, so our comparison of two
sealed-bid formats could have eliminated their
revenue differences. We conclude that, at least
for sportscard auctions, Vickrey sealed-bid auc-
tions may be substituted for uniform-price auc-
tions without an appreciable loss of revenue.
III. Conclusion
Multiunit auctions with multiunit demand are
extremely important in practice, from Treasury
bill auctions to FCC spectrum auctions to com-
mercial Internet auctions for computer equip-
ment and other goods. A recent wave of auction
theory has begun to model multiunit auctions in
more detail, and in this paper we conduct em-
pirical tests of this new body of multiunit auc-
tion theory. By running field auctions for
sportscards using both the Vickrey and the uni-
form price sealed-bid auction formats, we test
the theoretical prediction that demand reduction
is an important factor in uniform-price auctions.
Our data yield several important findings. First,
demand reduction is evident in the uniform-price
auctions, relative to the Vickrey auctions. Second,
the amount of demand reduction is frequently
large: the uniform-price auction results in signifi-
cantly more bids of zero and the bid reductions are
large enough to cause frequent changes in the
allocation of goods.25 Third, we find an anoma-
lous result that does not conform to theoretical
predictions: first-unit bids are higher in uniform-
price auctions than in Vickrey auctions. Fourth,
revenues are not systematically different across
auction formats, so efficiency gains in the Vickrey
auction do not come at the expense of reduced
revenues for the seller.
We hope to see these results replicated and
extended to more complicated environments.
First, one could replicate the same experiments
with induced values, to establish a more direct
connection between the laboratory and the field.
Second, one could consider increased numbers
of bidders and goods, since multiunit auctions
typically involve more than two bidders and
more than two goods. Increased numbers of
bidders might reduce demand-reduction effects,
by decreasing the probability of one’s own bid
affecting the price. Increased numbers of goods
might have the opposite effect, as the possibility
of more units at a lower price could increase the
incentives for demand reduction. We anticipate
that future theoretical and empirical work will
address these issues.
23 Extreme examples include the zero-bid equilibria of
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, where revenues are posi-
tive in the Vickrey auction but zero in the uniform-price
auction.
24 Our revenue results are likely to be the result, in part,
of the two countervailing bid effects we found: first-unit
bids favor the uniform-price auction, whereas second-unit
bids favor the Vickrey auction.
25 Our finding of demand reduction has potentially broad
implications. In addition to the well-publicized auctions for
Treasury debt sales and communications spectrum rights,
we note that WR Hambrecht1Co has recently announced
uniform price auctions for initial public offerings of corpo-
rate shares through its OpenIPO Web site. Our results may
also be relevant to auctions for pollution emission permits,
especially in thin regional markets (see Timothy Cason and
Charles Plott, 1996, and Robert Godby, 1998).
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